Not Scotist: understandings of being, univocity, and analogy in early-modern Reformed thought

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Several lines of recent scholarship have identified developing Protestant thought as Scotist and, specifically, have contended a dominance of the Scotist concept of the univocity of being in early modern Protestantism. The present essay examines early-modern Reformed metaphysics and theology and demonstrates that the contention is unfounded. Rather, the more typical approach to the language of being and related issues of predication concerning God and creatures in Reformed circles was advocacy of the analogia entis, often understood in a classical Thomist manner as an analogy of proportionality.

KEYWORDS Reformed scholasticism, Scotism, univocity of being, analogy, Thomism, Radical Orthodoxy

Introduction: the issue of Duns Scotus and early-modern Reformed thought

In the now outdated scholarship of the latter part of the twentieth century, Theodore Beza (1519–1605) was typically identified as the hero or villain of developing ‘Calvinism.’ Perhaps because that debate has outworn its usefulness or perhaps because the perennial (and one might add, perennially misguided) quest for heroes and villains in the history of thought has been driven to find the sources of its issues deeper in the past, the figure of Duns Scotus (c.1266–1308) has emerged as the new source of all that is bad and of most of what is good in the older Reformed tradition and, in some accounts, in the entire heritage of the Reformation.

One school of thought has argued that the various theological and philosophical distinctions employed by Reformed or Calvinist orthodoxy ought to be read in a Scotist manner, on the ground of a pervasive Scotism in late-medieval and early-
modern thought. Several studies belonging to this line of research argue that the older Reformed theology either held to the Scotist concept of the univocity of being or, at the very least, assumed a ‘univocal core’ in its language of God, even to the point of identifying univocity of being as the dominant view of seventeenth-century theologians. There are two primary grounds for their claim: on the one hand, Martijn Bac assumes that the identification of all individual beings as having the transcendental properties of being itself (unity, goodness, and truth) will yield a conception of univocity; on the other hand Bac and Andreas Beck look to other instances of univocal predication, as evidence of a concept of the univocity of being. This approach leads Bac to find an implication of univocity of being in the writings of one of the very authors who argued against it and supplies Beck with a basis for declaring that he can find among the Reformed ‘a nuanced univocity in the Scotistic sense’ (although he does note some exceptions, notably Maresius and Turretin).

Yet another approach to the issue of Scotism and the Reformation, related to the so-called ‘Lortz Thesis’ concerning the origins of the German Reformation, appears in the works of writers associated with Radical Orthodoxy and in the recent historical diatribe of Brad Gregory. The Lortz thesis (now largely discredited) had claimed that Luther’s theological revolt was precipitated by the decadent theology and philosophy of the later Middle Ages, specifically the developments that took place after Duns Scotus largely among the nominalists. With the Radical Orthodox writers and Gregory, the thesis has become more focused on Scotus and his understanding of the univocity of being. According to their theses, Scotus’ understanding of univocity created a profound problem, identifying the being of God with the being of creatures but nonetheless placed at an infinite distance from them, undermining traditional teaching concerning divine


3 Bac, ‘Perfect Will Theology’, 140.

4 Bac, ‘Perfect Will Theology’, 140, n. 113, citing Melchior Leydekker, Fax veritatis seu exercitaciones ad nonullas controversias quae bodie in Belgio potissimum moventur: ... Praefixa est praefatio de statu Belgicae Ecclesiae, & suffixa dissertatio de Providentia Dei (Leiden: Daniel à Gaesbeek et Felix Lopez, 1677), 126 (explicit denial of univocity), and 252-253 (purported implication of univocity); cf. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius, 220-221.

transcendence. Scotus becomes the ‘crucial’ figure in a general shift away from a focus upon the metaphysics of participation. This problematic theological and philosophical understanding then carried over wholesale into the Reformation, rendering Protestant theology highly flawed from the outset and, in the version of the thesis espoused by Gregory, yielding a defective understanding of the relationship of God and world, reason and theology, ultimately bringing about a new and highly secularized worldview as an unintended result of the Reformation.

Despite the several voices that have identified Reformed theology as philosophically eclectic, as also despite the scholarship indicating significant misreading of Scotus and the implications of his conception of the univocity of being on the part of Radical Orthodoxy, little has been done to address either form of the claim that Protestant and specifically Reformed or Calvinistic Protestant thought became foundationally Scotist. In what follows, I examine a series of philosophers and theologians who contributed to the Reformed intellectual milieu during the era of orthodoxy, from ca. 1590 to the end of the seventeenth century, and representing views found across the geographical spectrum of Reformed academies and universities, in Heidelberg (Zanchi), Geneva (Daneau, Beza), Danzig (Keckermann), Leiden (Junius, Burgersdijk, Jacchaeus, Heereboord), Franeker (Maccovius), Bremen (Crocius), Utrecht (Revis, Gisbertus and Paulus Voetius, Mastricht, Leydekker), Steinfurt (Timpler), Sedan and Groningen (Maresius), Cambridge (Crakanthorphe), Oxford (Twisse, Barlow, Gale), Aberdeen (Baron), Nimes (Derodon), Frankfurt-on-Oder (Grebenitz-Strimesius), Montauban (Chamier), Lausanne (Mueller), Herborn (Alsted), Duisberg (Clauberg), and Marburg (Goclenius, Combachius) — arguably, a representative sampling. The essay will demonstrate that, contrary to the assumptions of both the positive and the negative readings of a purported

10 Note that Burgersdijk initially taught at Saumur, Jacchaeus and Clauberg at Herborn, Derodon at Die. My thanks to David Sytsma for discerning dialogue and for help in identifying various of these Reformed sources.
Scotism in recent scholarship on early modern Protestantism, language of being or \textit{ens} in the older Reformed theology did not lean toward the Scotist conception of the univocity of being but rather, with few exceptions, tended toward a more or less Thomistic understanding of being as analogical.

\section*{Metaphysics in early-modern Reformed circles}

As a form of traditional Christian orthodoxy, the older Reformed theology embodied metaphysical concerns. Early in the Reformation, considerably prior to the publication of Protestant texts on metaphysics, the metaphysical underpinning of natural philosophy appears in Protestant physics texts by way of discussions of God and primary causality.\footnote{Philip Melanchthon, \textit{Initia doctrinae phy sicae} (Wittenberg: Johannes Luft, 1549); and Jerome Zanchi, \textit{Aristotelis de naturali auscultatione, seu de principiis} (Strasbourg: Wendelin Rihel, 1554). On Melanchthon and the development of Lutheran natural philosophy, see Sachiko Kusukawa, \textit{The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: the Case of Philip Melanchthon} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); on Zanchi’s approach to Aristotle, see Donald Sinnema, ‘Aristotle and Early Reform ed Orthodoxy: Moments of Accommodation and Antithesis’, in Wendy Hellem an, ed., \textit{Christianity and the Classics: The Acceptance of a Heritage} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 132-137.} So also are these metaphysical concerns present in the theological works of writers of the second generation of Reformers like Calvin, Vermigli, Hyperius, and Musculus, who consistently identified the divine essence as simple and spiritual, understood God as the first mover and first efficient cause of all things, argued the traditional doctrines of creation \textit{ex nihilo}, and assumed an overarching providential concurrence.\footnote{For example: John Calvin, \textit{Institutio christianae religionis} (Geneva: Robert Stephanus, 1559), Lxiii.i; xvi.1-5; Calvin, \textit{In Ezechel praelactiones}, in \textit{Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia}, edited by Guilielm us Baum, Eduardus Cunitz and Eduardus Reuss, 59 vols. (Braunschweig: Schwetschke, 1863-1900), 40, col. 48-49; Peter Martyr Vermigli, \textit{Loci communes}, editio secunda (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1581), Lxi.1-2; xii.1-2; xiii.1-10; Andreas Hyperius, \textit{Methodus theologiae, sive praecipuorum Christianae religionis locorum communium libri tres} (Basel: Ioannes Oporinus, 1567), 83-89; Wolfgang Musculus, \textit{Loci communes sacrae theologiae} (Basel: Johannes Hervagius, 1567), i, iv-v, xlii (3-4, 7-8, 21-25, 933-939).} Recent scholarship, moreover, has modified our understanding of early Reformation rejections of Aristotle and scholasticism and has pointed toward significant continuities with diverse currents in late medieval thought.\footnote{See David Bagchi, ‘Sic et Non: Luther and Scholasticism’ in Carl Trueman and R. Scott Clark, eds, \textit{Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment} (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 3-15; David C. Steinmetz, ‘The Scholastic Calvin’, in Bagchi, \textit{Protestant Scholasticism}., 16-30; Frank A. James Ifl, ‘Peter Martyr Vermigli: At the Crossroads of Late Medieval Scholasticism, Christian Humanism and Resurgent Augustinianism’, in Bagchi, \textit{Protestant Scholasticism}, 62-78; John Patrick Donnelly, \textit{Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace} (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Donnelly, ‘Calvinist Thomism’, in \textit{Vitator} 7 (1976): 441-455.} Although, Scotist as well as Thomist, nominalist, and Augustinian accents are evident among the Reformers of the first two generations,\footnote{See, for example, Daniel Bolliger, \textit{Infiniti contemplatio: Grundzuge der Scotus- und Scotismusrezeption im Werk Huldrych Zwinglis} (Leiden: Brill, 2003); Karl Reuter, \textit{Das Grundverstaendnis der Theologie Calvins} (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1963).} what we do not find is a fully developed metaphysics and certainly not any indication of how they might have dealt with the question of univocity of being.\footnote{Contra the undocumented assertion in Gregory, \textit{Unintended Reformation}, 41. Calvin’s thought is notoriously difficult to characterize philosophically: see the excellent summary statement, critical of Radical Orthodoxy’s reading of Scotus and of Calvin, in J. Todd Billings, \textit{Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers and Union with Christ} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 26-38.}
Early on, however, some Reformed writers did raise the issue of predication of divine attributes, presaging the paths taken later on the question of being. Thus, Wolfgang Musculus held that the only name or term properly assigned to God was YHWH or Jehovah: all other names were predicated equivocally.\(^{16}\) Musculus, in short, denied univocal predications of God and creatures and left little room for analogy. Another resolution of problem of the predication of divine attributes occurs in Andreas Hyperius’s *Methodus theologiae* (1567) and Girolamo Zanchi’s *De natura Dei* (1577). Zanchi poses a question (given that many terms referencing God are predicated of creatures and many terms referencing creatures are predicated of God): how ought these predications to be understood? His answer, like that of Hyperius, is that ‘the terms [nomina] that are predicated of God and creatures are neither univocal nor simply equivocal, but are predicated ἀναλογικα.\(^{17}\) Univocal predication is ruled out given that goodness, for example, is uncreated and most perfect in God and is not an accidental property, whereas in creatures goodness is created, incidental (*accidens*), and imperfect. Nor is the predication utterly equivocal, given that ‘between God and the things created by God there is a most beautiful order,’ with God as the efficient and final cause of all created things — as Scripture teaches, all things are ‘from him, through him, and to him.’\(^{18}\) The perfections of all things are in God and their similitudes are in the creatures.\(^{19}\) Zanchi’s view was carried forward by Daneau and probably also Beza, who denied the univocal predication of attributes to God and creatures and, specifically following Aquinas on the point, affirmed analogical predication.\(^{20}\)

As universities in principalities that had adopted the Reformation began to reframe those aspects of their curricula that reflected theological and philosophical concerns, the issue of teaching metaphysics and of the nature and limits of metaphysics was also broached in Reformed circles.\(^{21}\) The result was a variation of the tradition of Christian Aristotelianism, not a simple recourse to late medieval patterns, but an adaptation of the Peripatetic tradition as it had been carried forward from the Middle Ages into and through the Renaissance.\(^{22}\) Further, the result was not a specifically Reformed or confessional metaphysics, but a traditional Peripatetic philosophy modified variously in Augustinian and Platonist directions that shared a

\(^{16}\) Musculus, *Locii communes*, xli (922).


\(^{18}\) Zanchi, *De natura Dei*, lx, q. 8 (29), citing Romans 11:36.

\(^{19}\) Zanchi, *De natura Dei*, lx, q. 8 (29): ‘inter Deum vero, & res creatas, similitudo est. Perfectionibus enim omnibus, & ipso Esse, similis sunt omnes Deo’.


common ground with the metaphysics taught in Roman Catholic and Lutheran circles and that debated most of the same issues. What can be established is which lines of traditionary conversation and debate concerning the definitions and implications of metaphysics were characteristic of Reformed contexts and how they carried over from philosophy into the Reformed theologies of the era. Reformed writers specifically reference one another’s opinions as well as the views of such thinkers as Duns Scotus, Peter of Aquila, Peter Aureole, Aquinas, Cajetan, Zimara, Fonseca, and Suarez. The immediate source of debate over the univocity of being that occurred in the seventeenth century was the metaphysics of Franciscus Suarez in which the concept of the univocity of being played a prominent role.

Reformed concepts of ‘being’: univocal, equivocal, or analogical?

I. Predication, being, and God, ca 1590–1640.

As might be expected from the breadth of the debate and the significant number of opinions referenced, there was a diversity of solutions to the question of the predication of being among the early modern Reformed. One approach to the question is found in the early seventeenth-century metaphysics of Bartholomaeus Keckermann. In defining metaphysics and arguing the case for the discipline, Keckermann indicates that there can be a scientia concerning the ‘highest degree of things, or of Being’ in which human knowledge reaches its ultimate extension. The proof of the point lies in a series of questions concerning essence or quidditas: if one asks what is Peter (quid sit Petrus), the answer is a human being; if one asks what is a human being, the answer is an animal; if one asks what is an animal, the answer is a living body (corpus vivum); from the idea of living body, one can ascend to the idea of body in a simple or general sense; if one asks what is a body, the answer is a substance; and, finally, if one asks what a substance is, the answer is ‘a thing or being existing of itself’ [res sive Ens per se existens]. Each of these quiddities is dealt with in a particular branch of knowledge, a scientia (and the particular scientia devoted to being is called prima philosophia or Metaphysics).

Against what is probably the Suarezian view, Keckermann rejected the language of univocity as well as the related inclusion of God in the subject of metaphysics on the ground that God is ‘supra ens’ as also ‘super omnem Substantiam

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25 Bartholomaeus Keckermann, Scientiae metaphysicae compendium systema ... in duas partes (Hanau: Gulielmus Antonius, 1609), 17–18.

26 Keckermann, Scientiae metaphysicae, 18.
& Accidens,27 a line of argument carried forward in such writers as Alsted and Gale.28 Having identified God as above being, Keckermann would go on to identify the subject of metaphysics as the being created by God, understood as being absolutely considered, in its incomplex referencing of individual species: homo, identified as such, without modification, understood as a species, belongs to being in the proper sense. Thus qualified, having removed God from the category of being, Keckermann can state that ‘Being or reality is the highest genus, beyond which neither human understanding nor human words can ascend,’ the genus generalissimum.29 The formulation points toward either an analogical or equivocal use of being when referencing God.

In the same era, Richard Crakanthorpe indicated that ‘being is the most general, equivocal notion or conception, by which is signified that which is existive, namely, that which either is an essence or has essence.’30 Por Crakanthorpe, the term ‘being’ cannot have a univocal usage. The term must be recognized as equivocal, Crakanthorpe adds; this was the position both of Porphyry and of Aristotle, inasmuch as Aristotle had pointed out that ‘being itself (as generally considered) is nothing, which is to say it denotes no thing or nature.’31 Both God and creatures are foied notions; and it is rightly indicated by Aquinas that ‘nothing can be predicated univocally and essentially of God and creatures.’32 Crakanthorpe stood, therefore, specifically against the appropriation of the Scotist and Suarezian concept of the univocity of being into metaphysics, taking an aspect of the Thomistic reading of the issue toward the alternative conclusion of equivocity.33

There are also variant expressions and further elaborations of the issue found among various Reformed philosophers. Timpler, who also held against Suarez and the Scotist tradition that being cannot be predicated univocally of God and

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27 Keckermann, Scientiae metaphysicae, 23-244; Scotus it should be noted excluded God from metaphysics, but on rather different grounds: he held that no science demonstrates the existence of its subject; Being is the subject and God the finis of metaphysics: see Scotus, Reportata Parisenense, i, prol., q. 3, art. 1, in Opera omnia, edited by Luke Wadding, 26 vols. Paris: (Vives, 1891-1895), vol. XXII, 50, 52. Keckermann argued what, in his time, was identified as the Platonist as opposed to the Aristotelian definition of Ens: see Rudolph Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aperuntur (Frankfurt: Matthias Becker, 1613), s.v. ens (147), offering as an Aristotelian definition: ‘Ens est omne id, quod est extra nihil [...] in hac significacione Deus est Ens’; and, as a Platonic definition, noting that God is ‘supra Ens & pura puta Entitas’; similarly, Goclenius, Isagoge In Peripateticorum & Scholasticorum Primam Philosophiam, quae dici consuetum Metaphysica. Accesserunt disputationes huius generis aliquot (Frankfurt: Zacharias Palthenius, 1598), 10, leaning toward the Platonic definition inasmuch as God, unlike creatures, is actus purus and proprie est seu existit, proprie non habet esse; and denying that God can be the adequate subject of metaphysics (14).

28 Johann Heinrich Alsted, Metaphysica: tribus libris tractata, per praecepta methodica, theorematum selecta & commentario dilucida. Quae omnia inferioribus disciplinis constituentes & percepientis sibi compendiarum patefactum (Herborn: Christoph Corvinus, 1613), 11 (28); Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles, or, A discourse touching the original of human literature, both philologic and philosophy, from the Scriptures and Jewish church, 4 parts in 5 vols (Oxford and London: [various publishers], 1670-1678), IV, i, liii: 'ipsum ens & pura puta Entitas'; similarly, Goclenius, Isagoge In Peripateticorum & Scholasticorum Primam Philosophiam, quae dici consuetum Metaphysica. Accesserunt disputationes huius generis aliquot (Frankfurt: Zacharias Palthenius, 1598), 10, leaning toward the Platonic definition inasmuch as God, unlike creatures, is actus purus and proprie est seu existit, proprie non habet esse; and denying that God can be the adequate subject of metaphysics (14).

29 Keckermann, Scientiae metaphysicae, 20-21.

30 Richard Crakanthorpe, Introductio in metaphysicam (Oxford: Johannes Lichfield, & Iacobus Short, 1619), i (6): ‘Ens est notio seu conceptus aequivocous omnium communissimus, quo significatur quicquid est existive, id est, quicquid vel est essentia, vel habet essentiam.’

31 Crakanthorpe, Introductio in metaphysicam, i (7), citing Aristotle, Peri hermenias, Liii: ‘ipsum ens (ut communiter sumitur) nihil esse, id est, nullam rem aut naturam notare, sed solum voce aequivocam esse affirmat.’

32 Crakanthorpe, Introductio in metaphysicam, i (7), citing Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, I.xxxii: ‘At nihil omnino de Deo & creaturis univoce & essentialiter praedicari potest, ut recte probat Aquinas.’

33 Contra Gregory, The Unintended Reformation, 53-54, who appears to view Suarezian metaphysics and its approach to univocity as relatively uncontested in its time.
creatures, nonetheless held, agreeing with Scotus, that it could be predicated univocally of created substances and their properties; Crakanthorpe disagreed and did so on the basis of Aristotle, reflecting the ongoing debate over the problem of predication. Crakanthorpe’s view was that if being were predicated univocally of all creatures, then it would have to be considered as a genus. A genus, however, is determined by the differentiae shared by each of the species within it; but being, as the most universal or general concept, having the transcendental property of unity, cannot have differentiae, and therefore cannot be considered as a genus except equivocally. In the equivocal usage only, Crakanthorpe accepted Keckermann’s identification of ens in the finite order as the ‘most general genus.’

Another line of argument, arguably the majority view among the Reformed, appears in the works of Baron, Burgersdijk, Jacchaeus, Alsted, and Combachius. Baron identifies two extremes of opinion that must be rejected: the first is that of Peter Aureole, ‘who claims that Ens is a merely equivocal term with respect to substance & accidents’; the second is that of Scotus, ‘who claims that Ens is something univocal with respect to substance & accidents.’ Aureol’s view is to be rejected inasmuch as equivocal terms do not refer properly to anything signified and the term ens does properly refer to things signified that have esse. Scotus’ view is also to be rejected, on the grounds that being cannot be predicated univocally either of uncreated and created being or of substance and accidents. Univocal predication functions with reference to things that belong to the same genus: thus, ‘animal’ is predicated univocally of human beings and brute beasts. With regard to God and creatures, univocal predication is impossible inasmuch as it would be absurd to include in a genus something that is utterly superior to the genus. Moreover, created beings are composite of genus and differentia and God is not.

As to the univocal predication with regard to substance and accidents, this is ruled out for Baron on the grounds that accidents or incidental properties cannot be identified as ens absolutely or simpliciter, but rather only according to an ‘analogy of dependence.’ This latter argument is significant not only because it appears in many of the Reformed works on metaphysics but also because the univocity of

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34 Clemens Timpler, Metaphysicae systema methodicum, libris quinque per theoremata et problemata selecta concinnatum. ... Accessit eiusdem technologia ... Seorsum accesserunt Rodolphi Goclenii philosophi cl. notae & scholia (Hanau: Haeredes Gulielmus Antonius, 1612), Lii.12.

35 Crakanthorpe, Introductio in metaphysicam, I, 7-9, citing Timpler, Metaphysica, I.i.5; and Aristotle, Metaphysica, III.iii.


37 Baron, Metaphysica, I, 420-423-424; cf. against Scotus, Combachius, Metaphysicorum, libri duo, Lii.11, 20 (20-21, 20-25, 29-33).

38 Baron, Metaphysica, I, 423-424.

39 Baron, Metaphysica, I, 424.
being in substance and accidents is one of the grounds on which Scotus argued the univocity of being in God and creatures.

Although in Baron's and Combachius's metaphysics, the first book is devoted to being in general, the second to separate spiritual beings, with God as the principle being, neither writer allows for a univocity of being and neither allows that God is the subject of metaphysics in general. Like the several other Reformed writers who take this approach, they argue that ens cannot be taken univocally when predicated of God and creatures, but rather must be understood analogically. Combachius addressed the problem in general, indicating that there could be no univocal predications of being and its transcendental properties to all individuals inasmuch as this would require a 'single concept on the part of the thing' such as could be the case only with species of the same genus. If Scotus were correct in arguing the univocity of being, then a single objective concept of being could be predicated of all things in the same way and according to the same definition, including 'inferiors,' namely dependent, derivative, or caused beings as well as of their causes. Quite to the contrary, species belonging to the same genus are independent of one another. Dependency indicates a difference in genus. Combachius concluded, therefore, that being cannot be predicated univocally of inferiors; rather it is predicated variously (multipliciter). Accordingly, there cannot be a parte rei [in respect of the thing] any objective concept predicated univocally of all being.

Combachius added, however, that a single concept a parte intellectus can be understood as predicated in a single way or mode of things when there is a proportional relationship, namely an analogy of proportionality. Thus divine and human wisdom, are diverse, indeed, utterly different in kind (toto genere inter se diversas), but can be conceived and considered under one mode: divine wisdom stands in relation to the divine nature in a mode proportionate to the way that human wisdom stands in relation to human nature. Similarly, according to Jacchaeus, ens is understood analogically when used to identify the common genus of all things in their substances and accidents. The analogia entis is an analogy of proportionality.

II. The univocity and analogy of being in the later seventeenth century.
Johannes Clauberg, who could be described as a mind in transition from a modified Peripateticism to an adapted Cartesianism, stated categorically in his earlier work that notwithstanding the infinite distance separating God and

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40 Combachius, Metaphysicorum, libri duo, Li; Il.i (29-30, 302), citing Aristotle, Metaphysica, IV.2; Baron, Metaphysica, II.i (412-422); see also Thomas Barlow, Exercitationes aliquot metaphysicae, de Deo: quod sit objectum metaphysicae, 2nd edn (Oxford: A. Lichfield, 1638), III (102), citing Suarez, Metaphysicae disputationes, 1, d. 1, sec. 3.
41 Combachius, Metaphysicorum, libri duo, Li; ii (29).
42 Combachius, Metaphysicorum, libri duo, Li; ii (29).
43 Jacchaeus, Institutionum metaphysicarum, Lv (15-20); Combachius, Metaphysicorum, libri duo, Lii (29-33).
44 Cf. Jacchaeus, Institutionum metaphysicarum, Lv (26).
creatures, there is a similitude among them as between the cause and the thing caused and they possess names or terms in common; accordingly, while things cannot be attributed univocally to God and creatures, they can be attributed analogically.\textsuperscript{47} Later, when he divided being into corporeal and incorporeal in a rather Cartesian manner, he discussed the being 'of God and creatures, and of all individual beings according to their mode,' annotating his language of 'mode' with the comment 'if not univocal, failing an alternative, analogical [\textit{si non univoce, saltem analogice}],\textsuperscript{48} perhaps indicating an affinity with Cartesian understandings of univocity, but not arguing any position as definitive. Clauberg also noted, still in some accord with the Peripatetic tradition, that 'God is being absolutely [\textit{simpliciter}], creatures are beings relatively [\textit{secundum quid}].\textsuperscript{49}

Among the late-seventeenth-century Reformed philosophers, specific denial of univocity is found in the thought of the semi-Cartesian, Daniel Derodon, who posits a carefully formulated \textit{anologia entis}. Derodon insists specifically against the Suarezian and Scotist understandings, that 'Being with respect to God & Creatures, substance & accidents, is neither purely univocal, nor purely equivocal, but analogical.'\textsuperscript{50} In Derodon's view, 'pure univocity' cannot follow when there is an 'essential dependence of an inferior on another,' inasmuch as univocity requires 'requires essential independence.'\textsuperscript{51} In the case of finite individuals, independent of one another, in all genera, the standard categories can be predicated univocally.\textsuperscript{52} There is a properly univocal predication, it simply does not apply to language concerning God and creatures, substance and accidents; rather it applies to finite genera and species.

Johannes Maccovius and his commentator, Adriaan Heereboord, identify being as genus in an analogical sense inasmuch as 'Being with respect to God & creatures, substance & accidents, is analogical.'\textsuperscript{53} If 'being' is to be understood as a genus, it is an 'analogical genus [\textit{genus analogum}], not a genus in the strict ontological sense of the term, but a conceptual genus in which one species has the name or nature intrinsically, another species by participation or dependence on the

\textsuperscript{47}Johannes Clauberg, \textit{Elementa philosophiae sive ontosophia, scientia prima, de iis Deo creaturisque suo modo communitur attribuuntur} (Groningen: Joannes Nicolai, 1647), i.3-4 (1-2).

\textsuperscript{48}Johannes Clauberg, \textit{Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius ontosophia, aliarum disciplinarum, ipsius quoque iurisprudentiae & literarum, studiosis accommodata}, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam: Daniel Elzevir, 1654), i (1, 88).

\textsuperscript{49}Clauberg, \textit{Metaphysica de Ente}, iii.29 (7).


\textsuperscript{53}Johannes Maccovius, \textit{Metaphysica, ad usum quaestionem in philosophia ac theologica adornata & applicata, explicata per Adriaan Heereboord}, 3rd edn (Leiden: Franciscus Hackius, 1658), Li (1, nota c): 'Ens respectu Dei & creaturarum, substantiae & accidentis, est analogum.'
former. Maccovius also argues that 'knowledge of God is not comprehensive, but apprehensive' inasmuch as God cannot be perfectly grasped.\(^{54}\) Further, 'God is apprehended by an analogical knowing, not [by analogy] of the thing but of the concept.'\(^{55}\) This must be the case since analogy by reason 'of the thing' assumes that the analogates belong to the same genus; but this is not true of God and creatures: what remains is an analogy of the concept according to which infinite God is known by similitude of concept to things that are finite.\(^{56}\) Creatures, moreover, have being by participation or \textit{inaeualiter} in relation to God; they do not have being in the sense that God has being, since their being is dependent on the divine. Heereboord notes specifically that this understanding 'is opposed to a univocal genus' in which individuals participate equally and independently of one another. An example of a univocity is the genus 'animal' in which humans and animals participate in independence from one other.\(^{57}\) God, therefore cannot be discussed under the rubric \textit{ens in genere}, the subject of metaphysics; rather God is to be recognized as \textit{causa efficiens} \& \textit{finis Entis in genere}, 'the efficient and final cause of being in general.'\(^{58}\)

This distinction in being between God and creatures carries over into Heereboord's comments on the transcendental properties of being. Being one (\textit{unum}) is a property in one sense of the being of God whose essence is 'certain, determinate, unique, not varied, not multiplied, not divided from himself' — and a property in somewhat different sense of creatures such as humans insofar as they require only a single rational soul, a single body, and exist as a single being.\(^{59}\) So also is the property of being good (\textit{bonum}) understood differently of God and creatures: God is good in the manner of the end or goal; creatures are good in the manner of means tending toward God, to the glory of God.\(^{60}\) Creatures are beings, one, good, and true by analogy, arguably an analogy of proper proportionality.

These definitions and assumptions are reflected but ultimately argued in a different direction in the commentary of the Reformed philosopher, Jacobus Revius, on Suarez's \textit{Metaphysica}. Revius declares categorically that metaphysics does not serve to complete theology but, citing Aquinas and Cajetan, rather

\(^{54}\) Johannes Maccovius, \textit{Distinctiones et regulae theologicae et philosophicae} (Franeker: Joannes Archerius, 1653), iv.3: 'Cognitio Dei non est comprehensiva, sed apprehensiva.'

\(^{55}\) Maccovius, \textit{Distinctiones et regulae}, iv.4: 'Deus apprehenditur cognitione analogica, non rei, sed conceptus.'

\(^{56}\) Maccovius, \textit{Distinctiones et regulae}, iv.4.

\(^{57}\) Maccovius, \textit{Metaphysica, ad usum}, I.i (3, nota c), 'Genus analogum est, cuius una species alteri debet hoc, quod nomen & naturam generis participet, ideoque convenit speciebus inaeualiter & cum dependentia unius speciei ab alia; sic creatura debet Deo, accidens substantiae, quod nomen, & naturam Entis participent; ei oponitur genus univocum, quod ex aequo participatur a singulis speciebus, ut neutra ab altera hic dependeat; quale est animal respectu hominum & bruti; neque enim homo debet brutu; neque brutum homini, quod utrumque sit animal'; and cf. Heereboord, \textit{Meletemata philosophica in quibus plectaeque res Metaphysicae ventilantur}, tota Ethica katartiketikakis kai \textit{akakousoi}kex explicatur, \textit{universa Physica per theorematas et commentarios expositur, summa rerum Logican per Disputationes traditur}, editio nova (Amsterdam: Henricus Wetsstenius, 1680), xlvi.7 (218).

\(^{58}\) Maccovius, \textit{Metaphysica, ad usum}, I.ii (6).

\(^{59}\) Maccovius, \textit{Metaphysica, ad usum}, lv (17-18, nota b).

\(^{60}\) Maccovius, \textit{Metaphysica, ad usum}, I.viii (52, nota a).
serves to convince infidels of certain truths; and theology, as such, rests on divine light only and serves to perfect or complete truths learned from the natural light. Against Suarez, Revius argues that to confound or confuse the first and most general philosophical doctrine de Ente qua Ens with the doctrine de Deo dignitate prima is a 'most infamous equivocation.' When he comes to Suarez's arguments concerning the univocity of being as applied to God and creatures, Revius states that the term is not to be understood to be used synonymously but rather homonymously, that is: as having the same sound but a different meaning, yielding a certain ambiguity. The 'false opinion of Scotus concerning the univocity of Being among God and creatures' is easily recognized and the equivocation made clear inasmuch as 'essentially dependent Being and essentially independent Being, by reason of essence, albeit under the same name, have different meanings.' Revius cites Cajetan for a definition of equivocity and notes that, in Cajetan's view, analogical predication is actually a kind of equivocity. He goes on to cite Camerarius at length to argue in more detail that there can be no genuine mean between univocity and equivocity.

The high orthodox era did bring at least one exception to the general tendency of metaphysicians in Reformed circles on the question of the univocity of being: theses disputed by Elias Grebenitz under the presidency of Samuel Strimesius, professor of philosophy at Frankfurt-on-Oder. In the 'special' section of his metaphysics, where he discusses the 'division of being' into God and creatures and argues the necessary connection but also necessary distinction between God as ens absolutely considered and 'inferior' beings, Grebenitz argues for a 'universal concept.' Those who deny this way of understanding the division, he continues, admit an analogy between God and creatures on grounds of participation or composition; in his view, however, it is more suitable to recognize that the division of being into ens a se and ens ab alio or into infinite and finite being is based on formal reasons, formal synonymy, or rational univocity. The use of 'formal' in this context, taken together with Grebenitz's frequent recourse to Suarez, indicates the background to his argumentation.

Theological associations and applications

The strongly negative voice of Reformed philosophers and theologians on the univocity of being served, among other things, to distinguish the disciplines of theology and metaphysics and to stand in the way of a merger the two disciplines:

62 Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 2.
63 Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 516.
64 Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 517: 'falsae opinioni Scoti de univocatione Entis inter Deum & creaturaram, ac facile [...] refelluntur. Hoc veram aequivocationem evicit, nam Ens essentialiter dependens & Ens essentialiter independens, rationem essentia, licet sub eodem nomine, diversam habent.'
65 Revius, Suarez repurgatus, 516.
66 Elias Grebenitz, Philosophi & Theologi Metaphysica (Frankfurt: Zeiler, 1677), Pars specialis, I.i.1–2 (152–153).
67 Grebenitz, Philosophi & Theologi Metaphysica, Pars specialis, I.i.2, 4 (153, 155).
Reformed writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made very clear distinctions between theology and metaphysics, indeed, between supernaturally revealed theology, natural theology, and metaphysics; alternatively, they rather strictly separated ‘general metaphysics’ from a ‘special metaphysics’ or natural theology. Their reasons for the denial are quite clear. If the univocity of being were accepted as a valid understanding, metaphysics, understood as the science of being, would with little qualification include discussion of God; if, however, the concept were questioned, a metaphysics might consciously limit or exclude discussion of God on the ground that God ought not to be considered as ‘being in general.’

Accordingly, the denial of univocity, taken together with the typical affirmation of an analogy of being, opened the way for the Reformed orthodox to argue a doctrine of the divine attributes that affirmed both the transcendence of God and the intimate relationship of God to the world order. Given that being could not not be predicated univocally of God and creatures, the Reformed typically stressed the accommodated or ectypeal character of God language and followed a language of analogical predication, typically noting either an analogy of proportionality or an analogy of attribution or proportion, when speaking of the divine attributes.

William Twisse, for example, comments on the similitude between the divine essence and created things noting that Aquinas rightly indicated the relationship to be an analogy of proportionality. ‘I do not deny,’ he continues, ‘that ens is said to be a genus analogum with reference to uncreated and created being.’

A passage from Franciscus Junius’s posthumous Summa aliquot locorum communium ss. theologiae illustrates various applications of analogy and also an instance in which there can be a univocal predication of God, the latter, arguably, demonstrating also the Reformed denial of the univocity of being. The text is important to the point because Beck cites it in part and implies that its reference to univocal predication implies the univocity of being. The issue arises, Junius indicates, because the essence of God cannot be perceived by human beings as it is, but only according to a human mode of understanding and speech. Human beings cannot see the light of the sun, secundum modi ipsius, even though it penetrates the whole world, but only see it secundum modulum nostrum. So much the more is the sight of God, who is infinite light, beyond our reach. This language of accommodation itself points toward analogies.

There are three degrees (gradus) of the perception of God, whether in nature or in Scripture. The ‘first is by negation or remotion,’ namely by the negation of various creaturely properties. The ‘second, commonly called [the mode] of perfection, namely, affirmation’ speaks of God by identifying the ‘perfections that

68 Cf. the discussion in Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, III, 167–170.
69 Thus, William Ames, Medulla ss. theologiae, ex sacris literis, earumque interpretibus, extracta, & methodice disposita (London: Robert Allott, 1629), Liv.11, 10, 34; cf. Voetius, Selectae disputationes theologicae, 5 vols (Utrecht: Joannes à Beusberge, 1648–1669), V, 50.
70 William Twisse, Dissertatio de scientia media tribus libris absoluta (Arnhem: Jacobus à Biejius, 1639), Digestio II, 305, citing Aquinas, De veritate, q. 3, art 1, ad 7, and art. 2, having also rejected the views of Scotus and Durandus.
71 Franciscus Junius, Summa aliquot locorum communium ss. theologiae, Il.ii, in Opera theologica Francisci Junii Biturigis sacrarum literarum professore eximii, 2 vols (Geneva: Caldorianus, 1607), II, separate pagination, ad fin, col. 32: ‘essentiae Dei non percipi ab homine, prout esse, sed prout comprehendit a nobis, & enuntiari sermone potest.’
are in creatures' as dependent on God and as present by way of similitude or vestige (secundum similitudinem aut vestigium). Thus God is identified as great, good, just, wise, powerful, and so forth.\(^\text{72}\) Scotus, it needs be noted, did not think highly of the distinction, characteristic of Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, between negation and affirmation, and disputed the validity of a via negationis.\(^\text{73}\) The predication here is arguably an analogy of proper proportionality, grounded in the relation that creatures have to God, the principle analogate: the objective concept is intrinsic to all of the analogates but is in creatures in a manner different than it is in God.\(^\text{74}\) The language of remotion and perfection as well as the language of similitude echo Zanchi, and Aquinas as well.

The third way or degree is by way of 'excellence or supereminence.' This predication refers particularly to the language of Scripture which references God in a way that is higher than the manner of referencing creatures and can, therefore, be called univocal.\(^\text{75}\) Junius then explains what he means by a univocal predication with reference to God. There are two points to be understood when something is predicated univocally of God. The first of these is a general assumption (communiter) inasmuch as God is the cause of all things, the reason or cause of why all things are what they are, and the cause of all good in things: in this way, heat is predicated univocally of fire inasmuch as it is the heat of the fire that accounts for the fire being hot. That is to say, the heat is essentially the same as the fire. The second point identifies the specific or unique (singulariter) character of the predication, given that God is not merely the author of all good, but is 'goodness itself, infinitely surmounting all good.'\(^\text{76}\) In other words, a term can be predicated univocally of God when the term is understood by way of excellence or supereminence, to be essential and intrinsic to God in a way that it cannot be to creatures. The term is predicated of God singulariter. This is clearly not an argument for the univocal predication of any term to both God and creatures; rather it argues a univocal predication of the term to God alone and implies an analogical form of predication to creatures. It is most probably also an analogy of proportionality, considering the attribute to be essential and perfect in God, derived and imperfect in the creatures. Junius's argument, therefore, actually points away from a concept of the univocity of being. This approach to the predication of divine transcendental properties or affections echoes Aquinas who consistently held that meaning of words predicated of God and creatures is proper

\(^{72}\) Junius, Summa aliquot locorum communium, II.ii (col. 32).

\(^{73}\) Cf. Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 3, q. 1, in Opera omnia, VIII, 9–10.

\(^{74}\) Cf. Daniel Chamier, Corpus theologicum seu loci communes theologici, praelectionibus publicis in academia Montalbanensi (Geneva: Samuel Chouet, 1653), III.iii (83), specifically identifying two patterns of analogy in the predication of divine attributes, one by negation, the other by affirmation.

\(^{75}\) Junius, Summa aliquot locorum communium, II.ii, col. 32: 'excellentiae sive supereminentiae (ut vocant) quomodo enuntiamus de Deo, quaecunque sunt in scripturis, & enuntiari possunt supra modum creaturarum omnium, id est, (ut loquentur) univoc.'

\(^{76}\) Junius, Summa aliquot locorum communium, II.ii, col. 32: 'Cum autem univoce de Deo praedicamus, duo simul volumus intelligi: primum communiter, qua causa est eorum omnium quae sunt, & qua omnia quae sunt, a Deo sunt quicquid sunt, aut habent boni. Sic enim calor de igne praedicatur univocè, quia calida quaecunque sunt a calore ignis calida sunt: deinde vero singulariter, qua Deus non solum est omnis bonus auctor: sed ipsa bonitas in infinitum superans omne bonum, quod ab ipsum potestatem est. In hunc itaque modum oportebit deinceps accipi, quaecunque de Deo ratione humana sumus enuntiatur.'
to God and by resemblance in creatures,77 and it neither places God into the order of being as a being like the creatures nor identifies God as inaccessible and unrelated in his infinitude.

Crocius and Maresius also specifically deny that *Ens* or, indeed, *Ens* understood as *substantia* can be univocally predicated of God and creatures. Creatures have *Entitas* only by dependence on God who exists *a se ipso*. Thus God and creatures are identified as *ens* in different ways; in Crocius’s view *ens* is predicated analogically of God and creatures, in Maresius’s view, equivocally — a point that Maresius makes specifically against the Socinians, Vorstius, and Duns Scotus.78 In the Maresian conception of the problem, the necessity and self-existence of God and the contingency and dependence of creatures bars the way to univocal predication. Maresius also indicates that *spiritus*, when predicated of God and creatures, is predicated equivocally.79

Voetius’s very brief comment on the issue stands in accord with Zanchi, Baron, Maccovius, Jacchaeus and the various other Reformed writers who argue an analogy of being. After answering in the affirmative to the question *An omne ens recte dividatur in finitum & infinitum?*, Voetius went on to ask: ‘*An divisio haec entis sit generis univoci in suas species, an vero homonymi in sua significata, an denique analogi in sua analogata?*’, affirming the final choice, namely the analogy of being.80 Elsewhere, he raised the questions of whether God is unnameable and of whether any terms could be univocally applied to God and creatures. To the former question Voetius responded that God could not be named in a fully commensurate way (*adaequate*), but only in an incommensurate manner (*inadaequate*), given that no finite mind is capable of a concept adequate to the representation of God; no human term can be identified as a word sent forth from God.81 To the latter question Voetius answered that there could be no ‘perfect univocation’ but that there could be predication if the language stepped back from

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77 Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, la. q. 13, a. 6, corpus; with Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, lxxxii.1–2, 5–6; xlvi.7.
78 Cf. Ludovicus Crocius, *Syntagm a sacrae theologiae quatuor libris adornat u m: quo exhibetur idea dogmatu m ecclesiasticorum* (Bremen: Bertholdus Villerianus, 1636), III.v (444): ‘Nam ratio entis in Deo infinite excedit eam, quae est in creaturis: unde non univoce, sed analogice de Deo & creaturis end praedicatur’; with Samuel Maresius, *Collegium theologicum sive systema breve universae theologiae comprehensum octodecim disputationibus* (Groningen: Joannes Nicolaus, 1649), ii.2 (21): ‘Ens enim aut *Spiritus* non univoce de Deo & Creaturis praedicatur, sed tantum *aequivoce*’; cf. Maresius, *Systema theologicum: hactenus saepius recusum, nunc vero locupletatum prolaxis annotationibus, ad illius explicationum & defensionum facientibus* (Groningen: Aemilius Spinneker, 1673), ii.2 (44).
79 Maresius, *Systema theologicum*, ii.2 (43).
80 Gisbertus Voetius, *Syllabus problematum theologorum*, quae pro re nata proponi aut perstringi solent in privatis publicisque disputationum, examinum, collationum, consultationum exercitii ... pars prior (Utrecht: Aegidius Romanus, 1643), fol. D1r-v.
univocation to a particular ‘unequal mode or manner’; specifically, the terms predicated of God and creatures were, therefore, analogical, either as an analogy ‘of dependence or attribution’ or as an analogy of ‘similitude or proportion.’

There is no ‘univocal core’ in Voetius’ expression, as Beck claims, unless it is a univocity of predications concerning finite genus and species. Voetius does not suppose that there must be some univocal predication of God and creatures, namely, being, in order to the justification of further analogical usage. The language of analogy chosen by Voetius thus points in a more or less Thomistic, not a Scotistic direction. And if his son, Paulus, is any indication, the analogy in question is an analogy of proportionality.

A Scotist approach to the problem has also been argued to be present in the thought of Richard Baxter (1615–1691), who in one place did imply the validity of Scotus’ account of the univocity of being, although, oddly, in the context of arguing the incomprehensibility of God and the absence of adequate formal concepts concerning God’s nature: human beings, Baxter comments, only have knowledge of God that is ‘analogical, aequivocal, metaphorical, or by similitude.’

He specifically states that ‘Neither substantia, Vita, Perfectio, Potentia, Actus, Intellectus, Voluntas, Love, Truth, Goodness, Mercy, &c. are formally and univocally the same in God and Creature.’ He then adds, ‘Scotus excepteth only ENS. Which is true, as ens is only a Logical term, signifying no more than EST or Quoddity, and not QUID est, or Quiddity,’ going, however, on to emphasize knowledge of God by similitude. What is more, even here, Baxter’s approach specifically runs against a Scotistic univocal understanding of other attributes, such as intellect and will.

Baxter’s positive comment concerning univocity, moreover, clashes directly with the point he made in his in Methodus, reflecting the standard rule that univocal predication cannot be made of individuals belonging to different genera, that predications of inferiors must be by analogy; also, that a majority of writers deny univocity and favor analogical predications concerning God and creatures. Elsewhere, Baxter makes clear that ‘Substance and Accident are Analogata,’ denying that aspect of Scotus’ theory of univocity, probably implying as well that Ens is understood analogically of God and creatures and that, in addition, there

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83 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius, 221.
84 Paulus Voetius, Prima philosophia reformata (Utrecht: Johannes à Waesberge, 1657), I.xxix–xxii (54–56).
85 Richard Baxter, An End of Doctrinal Controversies which have lately troubled the churches by reconciling explication, without much disputing (London: John Salusbury, 1691), viii.
86 Baxter, End of Doctrinal Controversies, viii–ix. Significantly, Baxter understands Scotus’ concept of the univocity of being as a logical, not an ontological concept.
are also terms predicated equivocally of God and creatures.\textsuperscript{89} The latter point was made against George Kendal. Baxter's intention was not to deny analogy or to identify it as merely equivocation; indeed, he explicitly indicates that terms are applied to God neither univoce nor pure aequipavco.\textsuperscript{90} Baxter goes on to offer favourable assessments of Zanchi, Jacchaeus, Aquinas and others on the use of analogy of proportionality with reference to God and creatures, on the denial of analogy of attribution, and on the denial that God is in a genus.\textsuperscript{91}

Melchior Leydekker states categorically, 'the concept of being & substance does not agree univocally to God and creatures, but analogically' and immediately adds, 'as is generally taught contra Scotus and his sycophants \textit{asseclas}.\textsuperscript{92} When commenting on the false theologies of pagans, he critiques very notion of polytheism with the comment that the distinction between 'the highest God & subordinate [deities], independent & dependent, infinite & finite' is absurd, given that 'the notion of Divinity includes infinitude' and that 'the Being of God is properly highest and independent.'\textsuperscript{93} Leydekker's point specifically counters Scotus' conceptual abstraction of being as such from concepts of finitude and infinitude. In other words, there is no genus 'god' and, presumably, God cannot be considered as a species within a genus, all of which places God language outside of the locations in which univocation is possible. When he comes to discuss the attributes of God, Leydekker argues against those who claim that all of the attributes are stated equivocally of God and creatures. He agrees that eternity and immensity are predicated 'utterly equivocally' of God and creatures, but other terms applied to God have a similitude and analogy among the creatures, notably, life, understanding, will, holiness, justice.\textsuperscript{94}

This assumption carries forward into the very passage that Bac cites to argue a hint of univocity. There, Leydekker indicates that there is truth prior to God's will, but not truth independent of God, inasmuch as all truth is founded in the divine essence itself: 'God, as existent and true being is the root and origin, the foundation of the truth of this principle, it is impossible at the same time to be and not to be.'\textsuperscript{95} The context is an argument against the radical voluntarism of the Cartesian, according to which, on his reading, the absolute power of God could

\textsuperscript{90} Baxter, \textit{Reduction of a Digressor}, 35. Despite his detailed argumentation, I cannot concur with Simon J.G. Burton, \textit{The Haloising of Logic: The Trinitarian Method of Richard Baxter's Methodus Theologiae} (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2012), 211–213, that Baxter ultimately adopts a Scotistic solution: Baxter, rather, appears to be exercising his vast knowledge of scholastic formulations, including Scotus as well as others, in order to argue the complexity of the problem against various adversaries; his own views include positive Thomistic as well as Scotistic references as well as positive uses of other medievals and various late Renaissance philosophers, indicating an eclectic appropriation rather than advocacy of one particular school of medieval thought.
\textsuperscript{91} Baxter, \textit{Reduction of a Digressor}, 34–36.
\textsuperscript{92} Leydekker, \textit{Fax Veritatis}, III.vii, obs. 1 (126): 'conceptum entis & substantiae non univoce sed analogice competere Deo & creaturis, ut docetur communita contra Scotum euisque asseclas', Note that Leydekker uses the pejorative, 'asseclas' as distinct from the more neutral 'assectatores.'
\textsuperscript{93} Melchior Leydekker, \textit{De veritate religiosis reformatae seu evangelicae, libri VII. Quibus Christiana de oeconomia S. Trinitatis in negotio salutis humanae explicatur, et Reformata fides ex certis principis, in verbo Dei revelatis, congruo nexu demonstratur & defenditur} (Utrecht: Rudolphus à Zyl, 1688), I.i.56.
\textsuperscript{94} Leydekker, \textit{Fax veritatis}, III.vii, fontes solutionum 1 (131–132).
\textsuperscript{95} Leydekker, \textit{Fax veritatis}, V.v, fontes solutionum 2 (252).
will something to be other than what it is; for example, will a four-sided triangle. The point, he notes, is not whether God could will something not to exist that he has willed to exist. That is uncontested. Rather, the point concerns the genera of the things themselves, so that God could not create a soul that was not a spirit, not could God create a human being, as a human being, who was not also a rational animal. The divine essence itself, then, as true and as necessarily existent, embodies the principle of non-contradiction and does so because 'all of the ideas of God concerning the essences and reality of possible creatures have God himself as object, and his essence as infinitely imitable *ad extra*'; still, this imitability does not imply 'creatures *extra Deum,*' in a 'primary sense'; rather, it indicates that all creatures are conceived 'as possibilities through the power of the most perfect and most potent divine essence.' Accordingly, it is a mistake to claim that creatures can have no knowledge of God, 'inasmuch as all things participate somehow in God; and unity, truth, and, goodness are affections belonging to created things, it is impossible that these do not in some way refer to God their creator.' Thus, the transcendental properties, *unitas, veritas* and *bonitas* are necessarily in uncreated God and present also as affections in created being, not absolutely, certainly not uncreatedly, but by participation, given the existence of creatures by participation in being.

Whereas Bac reads the text as implying univocity of being, or at least univocity of unity, truth, and goodness, given what Leydekker has argued concerning the divine attributes (not to mention his denial of the univocity of being), the argument ought to be interpreted as indicating an analogy. As Leydekker had previously indicated, communicable properties are predicated of God and creatures by similitude or analogy. By extension, unity, truth and goodness are transcendental properties of divine and of creaturely being and the properties themselves, as perfections or objective concepts are understood as intrinsic to the being of God and creatures, albeit in different modes: perfectly and infinitely in God, imperfectly and finitely in creatures. In short the predication is by an analogy of proper proportionality.

**Conclusions**

A significant sampling of philosophers writing in the Reformed context confirms the conclusion tentatively drawn in an earlier study from examination of the doctrine of divine attributes in the older Reformed theology: the Reformed are somewhat eclectic in their reception of traditionary models and patterns of explanation and a Scotist language of the univocity of being is not at all characteristic of Reformed orthodox thought. The absence of such language from what is arguably the majority of Reformed formulations on the issue of Being-language stands against the facile characterization of early modern Reformed thought as 'Scotist.' The documentary evidence points specifically toward a diverse

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96 Leydekker, *Fax veritatis, Vv, notandum 3* (248); cf. *argumenta* 2–3 (249).
97 Leydekker, *Fax veritatis, Vv, fontes solutionum* 3 (252).
reception of arguments concerning predication (whether related to predications concerning God and creatures or the nature of analogy) and a positive interest in Thomist as opposed to Scotist formulations. There is also, contra Gregory, no ground for claiming a nearly universal acceptance of Suarezian metaphysics.

After Zanchi and Daneau had established a Thomistic line of argument, specifically referencing Thomas Aquinas as distinct from later Thomists like Cajetan (1469–1534), denying univocity and affirming analogy, the majority of Reformed writers held to the basic denial of univocity of being, but were divided on the further question of the nature of the non-univocal predications. The greater number of writers examined echoed Aquinas by grounding the analogy in a doctrine of participation and arguing an analogy of proportionality: God is being essentialiter, creatures have being by participation. Indeed, the foundational arguments against univocity of being rest on the assumption of creaturely dependence and a metaphysics of participation. Twisse specifically references Aquinas on the point after rejecting views of Scotus and Durandus. Various others, like Baron and Barlow relied more on Cajetan and Suarez for their discussions of analogy but, against Suarez, denied the univocity of being. As Baron, Heereboord, and Bruguier, indicated, the case of God and creatures stood as an exception to the usual patterns of predication: univocity of concepts was a necessary assumption when developing arguments concerning the finite order. Univocal predication occurs when a generic term is predicated of two species or individuals belonging to the same genus; and from the perspective of the Reformed writers, either 'being' is not a genus or, if it is, God as superessential is not within it. The language of God as 'supra ens' found among some of the Reformed writers (Keckermann, Alsted, and Gale) points toward a Platonizing tendency, distinct from the more traditional Peripateticism of the majority.

A lesser number, including Musculus at the time of the Reformation and Crakanthorpe, Revius, and Maresius in the era of orthodoxy, denied both univocity and analogy and argued for an equivocal predication of being with respect to God and creatures. Grebenitz's affirmation of univocity is the single clear exception, with one of Clauberg's accounts potentially opening a door to the concept, but not very widely. Baxter's single positive reference to the Scotistic univocity of being must be placed into the framework of his more typical advocacy of analogy and of philosophical conclusions, such as those of Aquinas, Cajetan, Zanchi, and Jacchaeus, that ran counter to those of Scotus.

If one can speak of a 'core' of univocity in the Reformed language of predication, it is with regard to predications concerning a genus and its species or a species and its individuals, not with reference to God and creatures. Given, moreover, both the explicit denials of univocity of being on the part of the large majority of writers in Reformed circles, including the declarations of several that God must be understood as supra ens, and the equally explicit condemnations of Scotus on the issue by Baron, Combachiuius, Revius, and Leydekker, the Reformed approaches cannot be accommodated to the notion of 'reverent exposition' characteristic of Vos's argumentation, according to which Scotist meanings were
conveyed through the use of nominally Thomist vocabulary.\textsuperscript{99} Against the claim of Bac, discussions of the transcendental properties that appear in the metaphysics of these authors also typically include qualifications concerning the ways in which these properties belong to divine and creaturely being, presuming analogy rather than univocity.

The large number of Reformed denials of univocity of being calls into question both the positive and the negative readings of the Reformation as foundationally Scotist in its philosophical directions. Against the positive approach of Vos, Beck, Bac, and others, we must offer a partial verdict, inasmuch as the absence of one key Scotist theme, although it undermines their unqualified identification of Reformed theology as Scotist, does not demonstrate the absence of other Scotisms. Rather it points toward the generally eclectic reception of medieval materials on the part of the early modern Reformed. Against the negative approach of Radical Orthodoxy and Gregory, we offer a significantly firmer verdict. Whatever one concludes concerning the implications of the univocity of being, the claim that the concept invested itself in Protestant theology cannot be sustained, nor indeed that early modern Protestant thought evidenced a 'shift' away from a 'metaphysics of participation.' In short, their claim that the absorption of the concept of the univocity of being into early modern Protestantism accounts for the perceived problems of twentieth and twenty-first century secular culture is seen to be a sorry imposture.

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